Dissertation Conclusions

What is ‘heritage’? How will current ethical mandates change the discipline of archaeology in the future? What epistemological hindrances stand in the way of formulating this future practice? In attempting to answer these questions, this dissertation has covered a vast terrain of different literatures and specialties. This was necessary because not dissimilarly to the inter-linked associations presented for a single archaeological site, these singular questions impinge upon one another and must be considered together. I have also presented an over-abundance of data pertaining to one exemplary site of World Heritage where all of the various issues are involved in one degree or another. This, I felt, was necessary to do justice to the important issues involved and for the attempt at usefully combining two sets – qualitative and quantitative - of information. A final justification for such an extended treatment comes form the content of the argument. While I have hoped to maintain positive criticism throughout, where/when this has been viewed as negative I have strived to understand the arguments as thoroughly as possible – viz. the sage advice: do not criticize what you do not understand. Furthermore, when we get specific about any one of these literatures or research traditions, it quickly becomes apparent, again analogously to ‘heritage ecology’ of Teotihuacan, that there are complicated networks of ideas and arguments. To do justice to any single or particularly important circuit of information, close readings are necessary. Combined with the grander claims of this project, I wanted at all times to ground big statements with specific and carefully presented detail. Above all else, given the turn-over of ideas in the discipline, the many theoretical ‘camps’, and the additional volatility added by emerging pressures external to the discipline, I want to avoid ‘academic amnesia’. An unfortunate consequence of much scholarship, where ‘cutting edge’ misplaces a familiarity with the literature beyond the ‘citational shelf life’ of twenty years.

Nevertheless, a repeated theme of this dissertation is that we must cut ties with some of the preconceptions of what we think we do when we practice archaeology. Principally among these preconceptions is a representational epistemology. This is the deeply ingrained orientation of archaeological knowledge justified by correspondence to an ‘external reality’. The bulwark of carefully reasoned epistemological positions subscribing to this modernist belief have been assessed in detail, spanning recent archaeological theory, and some of their limiting settlements presented. All are important contributions to archaeological practice. However, these limitations turn on a reliance, in some instances explicit, in others more attenuated, upon correspondence as justification. Rather than refute the possibility of justification upon correspondence, my argument has borrowed much from work in science studies which urges a reconfiguration or re-orientation of this compass for knowledge in archaeology. The ontological argument, based upon close consideration of how archaeologists move from things to media, from archaeological remains to their mediation in mixed-media to make claims for the past, suggests that there is no ‘gap’ between world and word. No ‘ontological gap’ which must be bridged with faithfully mimetic representations. Instead, as in Latour’s ‘circulating reference’, many tiny gaps punctuate a continuum. There is, as a consequence, no epistemological need to make arguments based upon corresponding ‘leaps’ between matter and media. Working through the example of mapping practices at Teotihuacan, where a history of refining maps to be more accurate representations orients a research tradition focused upon urbanization, illustrated how the action of things themselves at the site have a role in making and working with maps. Thus the term ‘mediation’ - to include such things as maps, plans, profiles - is utilized instead of ‘representation’. Mediation draws attention to the activity of moving between archaeological materials and the media we deploy in making arguments about the past. This activity is driven by particular goals: archaeologists decide what qualities of the materials to bring forward for arguments, and what qualities are ‘sieved out’ of consideration. This is not a neutral process of ‘representation’; but neither is this partiality a basis for bias and skeptical doubt. Specific research goals drive what of the multiplicity of archaeological materials will be brought forward through mediation. Fulfillment of goals forms the measure of success in these endeavours. This reinforcing – but not, as I have argued, viciously circular – role of goals in mediating the past brings up the beleaguered spectre of epistemology.

A giving up on correspondence in archaeology raises the worry of relativism. Without a supposed external measure of our media and the arguments we deploy with them, it would seem to follow that we no longer have any manner of ‘measuring’ or adjudicating claims to know the past. I brought into focus two inter-related considerations to ameliorate this worry. First, despite operating with a faith in correspondence the various developments in archaeological theory cannot avoid Wylie’s ‘horns of the dilemma’. That is, they can neither avoid the danger of relativism nor incontrovertibly claim objectivity. Moreover, the manoeuvering of these various epistemic settlements between these poles defining the debate prove factious. The discipline fragments into insular ‘camps’ adhering to one version of justification or the other and the resultant pedagogical pedigrees and research programs create a hyper-pluralism in archaeology that I have reviewed. Though not advocating a unifying, ‘string theory’ to stitch the discpline together, I suggest that such a situation is detrimental because it impedes debate and collaborative research. In the end, is maintaining a modernist belief in correspondence worth the disciplinary consequences? Especially given that the initial epistemic unease of relativism has proven incurable? Some will disagree with this assessment, judging that competing programs actually foster better science, better claims to know the past. That internecine is, in fact, integral to the process archaeology – and science more generally. ‘Cumulative growth’ justifications for representational realism in science, drawing upon metaphors of natural selection, are compelling because they draw upon deeply ingrained attitudes of modernity. Such justifications, as pragmatists are quick to note, equally rely upon value judgments. The values favoring an overall goal of better research over the values of collaboration and debate – debate extending beyond the camps of like-minded researchers.

This raises the second point. The ontological argument from science studies only goes so far. It may assure us of the inability to stray far from real things of archaeological material because these ‘actants’ work with us in creating mediations. But to evaluate claims we cannot follow the Latourian advice and unpack, through thick descriptions, all of the movements wrapped up in circulating references that result in the published texts, scholarly presentations, and multi-media displays so central for the scholarly activity of archaeology. These ‘behind the scenes’ phenomena – traditionally referred to only as ‘raw data’ – are there, but they are ‘black boxed’ as it would be prohibitively time consuming to evaluate each claim. I have made every attempt at making this process transparent by offering up this dissertation’s process of moving from Teotihuacan to my conclusions. Both through the limited capacity of analog (Chapter 5 and the appendices), and in the augmented realm of the digital archive on the wiki. Nonetheless, this mode of evaluation is impractical. Instead, I discussed the ‘third way’ work of the pragmatist tradition and their simultaneous commitment to rigorous inquiry and the giving up of the failed modernist ‘dream of reason’ (correspondence). I presented their theoretical points to clarify their distinction from previous Continental or Analytic philosophies’ influence in the history of archaeological thought. Their novelty comes from the simplicity of their evaluative procedures. What is ‘true’ is distinguished from a permanent, ‘settled for all’ type of ‘True’ which bases itself on the litmus test of correspondence. They advocate temporary ‘truths’ in the full spirit of fallibility – a principle of humility integral to scientific conduct. These ‘truths’, or what can be claimed with ‘warranted assertability’, garner support over time depending upon how ‘fruitful’ they are. Do they lead to other courses-of-actions which are valued by others with alternate goals? With the ability to act from holding them for the fulfillment of specific goals. This places a greater importance on future results then on any idea of synchronic, abiding certain knowledge. What works well in the satisfaction of goals is reasonable to act from. Pragmatic criteria of evaluation emphasize profitability, fallibility, the community of enquirers - the more specific goals which may be satisfied by holding a ‘truth’, the more warranted we are in asserting it – and, most importantly, the active quality of knowledge. I argued that the pragmatic sentiment is closer to a design and engineering perspective, and that it bears relation to the better, non-epistemic justifications for realism in science that gather around Hacking’s slogan of active ‘intervention’. Simply put: ‘what works is’. These approahces to ‘agency’ expand the notion of activity beyond modernism’s enamorment with humanity, and begin to take seriously nature and things themselves. Not as distinct entities – at least not profitably distinguished – but as interconnected, intermeshed and coextensive ecologies packed with humans, things and companion species. The ramifications of such ‘augmented agency’ were only hinted at in this project. Consideration was restricted to reconfiguring archaeology’s epistemological tradition to a pragmatic sensibility.

I argued that just such a pragmatic sensibility is already present within the discipline. While these examples did not draw on explicit citations of influence, I suggested that much of ‘getting on’ with archaeology actually involves making pragmatic judgments. Spanning examples from the so-called processual and postprocessual camps, I took specific instances where the profitability for future research of accepting a claim or ‘representation’ was underscored, rather than testing, fitting or coherency. I then traced out the long history of maps at Teotihuacan, spanning more than 400 years, and highlighted their pragmatic ‘truthfulenss’ in terms of how well they served certain goals, rather than their obvious deviations from cartographic convention. The TMP map was discussed in the most detail, as it is held to be an exemplary case of the future fulfillment of action. While accuracy to the actual topographical terrain and features of the metropolis is usually the justification for the icon status of this map – a correspondence argument – I suggested instead that, in engendering an entire research tradition of urbanization at Teotihuacan, the TMP map is an excellent example of pragmatic criteria at work.

The final argument for reconfiguring how we go about archaeology (or at least how we think we do) involves the very impetus of this dissertation: heritage. As the interface between the public and the discipline of archaeology – both Cultural Resource Management and academic – ‘heritage’ is an incredibly important facet of what archaeologists are involved in worldwide. The importance of the concept, furthermore, grows apace the growth of non-specialists – of the public – who are increasingly involved with, and invested in, archaeology. Yet we have very little understanding of what ‘heritage’ is. A most ambiguous concept, I suggested that in spite of being so poorly defined, the emerging ‘heritage crusade’ presents the discipline an epistemological crisis if it adhered to representational correspondence. This is because, while increasingly forced to include non-specialist participation in the management and control of heritage, such accommodation is judged to interject subjective values, opinions and ideas. This was most succinctly underscored in the debates over ‘oral history.’ The resistance on the part of the discipline that was presented is explicitly wrapped in fears of relativism and the denuding of objective knowledge of the stuff of heritage.

I therefore presented an abundance of details in order to get specific about heritage at a model archaeological site. This was not simply to describe the myriad of associations formed through the material site – an archaeologically generated ‘ecosystem’ – but to develop pragmatic goals for future management of Teotihuacan. Archaeological sites are no longer, as they once were, considered to be research laboratories for archaeologists. We have known that an archaeological site affects the relations amongst residents of surrounding towns. This is particularly the case with monumental, and therefore generally heavily touristed, sites. Yet such recognition has usually been restricted to economic relations. I presented the case that this system of relations operates like an ecosystem hinged upon the site. And that more than simply economics, additional and equally important relations must be considered, such as spiritual beliefs and practices, diversionary activities and identity formation on the local, national and international scales. As a way forward, I argued that pragmatic criteria are not restricted to scholarly activity, but in fact characterize a larger, non-disciplinarian sensibility at large. The first order of business in getting specific about what heritage is at a site such as Teotihuacan is to understand the full gamut of these goals which are evinced in the associations formed on the part of archaeologists and non-archaeologists alike. The case study grounded the various associations formed with Teotihuacan on the part local community members and Mexican visitors on a range of background variables, and gave an assessment of the relative importance of these goals for heritage. Enabling a comparison of the relative strength or importance of these five primary associations with Teotihaucan, archaeological knowledge proved to be held in high regard. Yet economic, spiritualistic, diversionary and identity formation are also primary goals which direct activity at the site. Indeed, economics, on both a personal and more general scale, as well as formations of identity on the national and world scale were, overall, more important goals for Teotihuacan. It is also now possible to anticpate how management changes and activities of archaeologists affect the fulfillment of these diverse goals. For instance, a change in ‘on-site exposure’, so central to archaeological and economic associations, will produce changes in how visitors, students and local residents form practical goals for living with and understanding the archaeological zone. Future management of the precisely defined ‘heritage’ of Teotihuacan, reconfigured along pragmatic evaluation, can foster not only further archaeological research, but also, no longer deeming stakeholder associations to be interference with objective knowledge, practical measures to enable these equally related associations with the site.

Expanded to other sites of World Heritage, the results offer specific information as to which, why and how stakeholders can be involved in a non-exclusionary world archaeology. It is the hope and argument of this dissertation that a reconfigured archaeology, reconfigured along lines of knowledge production and management practices, can meet the dual challenges of both internal epistemological doubts and the external demands on the part of the public to have a stake in the past. Rather than threats to the role of archaeology as purveyor of the past, a reconfiguring of how we understand archaeological sites, what goals we feature for the pursuit of understanding, and the manner in which we integrate stakeholders into archaeological practice promises to elevate the discipline, more than ever, to the careful role of mediating collective heritage, past and present.

Dissertation References

Return to Conclusion: multiple associations of Teotihuacan

Containments