Dispersal - Hyperpluralism in archaeology

‘Exhausting and pointless’ might be the verdict handed down for scrutinizing the abstract and theoretical realm of archaeology’s various epistemic settlements. ‘Just get on with doing archaeology’ might be heard from those wearing their ‘golden-marshalltown awards’ (cf. Binford 1989:8). Yet what type of archaeology are we doing? A look at any recent compendia of archaeological approaches quickly attest to the shear variety of what’s on offer: cognitive-processual, behaviourist, phenomenological, neo-evolutionary, Darwinian, postprocessual, social, postcolonial (eg. Hodder 1991a, 2001, Maschner 2006, Meskell 2004, Preucel 1996a, Thomas 2000, Ucko 1995, Yoffee 1993). And inevitably, upon the review of any compendium, a complaint inevitably registers that such-and-such an approach has not been represented (eg. Schiffer 1998). Now the shelf-life of some of these approaches is limited, while others transmogrify under new epithets (such as the refiguring of postprocessual to social archaeology). Is this simply entrepreneurial brand-naming in the academic free market? A look at earlier compendia (eg. Leone 1972) does indeed reveal a bewildering diversity not registered before, despite a history of disciplinary wrangling Chapter 2.

Archaeology splinters into a “thousand archaeologies” (Schiffer 1988:479). I suggest, regional specialties and methodologies notwithstanding (Hodder 2003:6), this is substantively due to the failure of epistemological settlements. As discussed last chapter Chapter 2, reformulations of topics of inquiry in archaeology have been historically bound up with reformulations of epistemological frameworks adequate for investigating such topics. Which operates primordially is moot as both occur in tandem: did Binford’s interest in a non-normative, cultural ecology view of culture predate his push for a positivist framework eminently amenable to establishing bio-physical laws? Or is it possible to disentangle the postprocessual reformulation of culture as significantly ideational from the interest in frameworks such as hermeneutics and neo-Marxism? Each is symptomatic of the other. With the accumulation of criticisms of Binford’s positivism and extra-somatic view of culture, alternate epistemologies have been forwarded as being more practical, less prone to errors of inconsistency or assumptions and more capable of providing a means to the end of understanding new or pertinent topics of concern. The major explicit formulations of these have been assessed and some of their difficulties pinpointed. All have accepted the terms of the debate as defined by traditional epistemology: objectivity versus relativism. And all have formulated explicit disavowals of an ‘anything goes’ relativism. While all are characterized by sagacious thinking, none is capable of navigating the Charbrydis and Scylla of relativism and objectivism. Instead, the have expanded the grey ‘middle-ground’ extending between these two landmarks. And dispersed along this large inter-territory of epistemic settlements are the various archaeological camps. The lack of solution to the perennial objectivity versus relativism creates a lack of critical debate about the matters of concern for archaeology and the possibility for knowing them. The resultant quiescence is instead an acquiescence to the anxiety posed by the intractable problem of epistemology while hyper-incommensurable platforms and niches proliferate.

Indeed, Post-1997, with the publication of the explicit confrontation of the issue by the Lampeter Archaeology Workshop, the active (and acrimonious) debates concerning relativism and objectivity have abated in the literature. Instead, following Trigger (1998), the most recent pairing of the divergent platforms’ stances to the relativism/objectivism question has been more conciliatory (eg. Hodder 2003a, Kosso 2001, VanPool 1999, 2003), or have been deflected to extra-disciplinarian discussions of the very nature of scientific practice (eg. Hodder 2003a:6-7, Hutson 2001, Wylie 2002:200-11). Indeed, Hodder (2003:6) warns of attempts to corral the heterogenous and fragmented intellectual currents of archaeology if this stifles debate and critique – a complacency which “might be seen as dangerous”. In fact, it seems that hyper-pluralism stifles debate and criticism as it envelops in its acquiescent form of ill defined criteria of judgment any position. ‘Anything goes’, the universally denied fear of any epistemology commentator, arises not from the specter of radical postprocessualism or ‘hyper-relativists', but from the very proliferation of middle-grounds opened up by such an enamored focus on epistemology positioning. Epistemology is a revolving door.

For those archaeologists not abjuring from the meta-archaeological questioning altogether (cf. Trigger 2003:137-8, Wylie 2002:12-13, 2006:6-8), two principle maneuvers characterize the attempts to ameliorate the anxiety surrounding such current epistemic unease. One, characteristically focusing on methodology, focuses on the similarities in evidential support and reasoning drawn upon to bolster the conclusions of whatever theoretical framing (Kosso 1991, Kosso 2001:72-3, VanPool 1999). The second, paralleling arguments from post-Kuhnian philosophy of science, especially work under ‘disunity’ or ‘standpoint’ metaphors (Dupre 1993, 1996, Feyerabend 1993, Galison 1996, Harding 1998, 1991), suggests that while there is undeniably pluralism in theory and method of archaeological communities, such a pluralism cumulatively effects a more robust understanding of the past (Clarke 1972, Hodder 2001, Hutson 2001, Preucel 1991b, Wylie 2000a, Wylie 2000b).

Careful reasonings underscore these positions, particularly those eschewing general principles (notably Hempel’s ‘covering laws’) capable of subsuming the inherent complexity of human culture (Clarke 1972:4). The application-side corollary being that multiple approaches, like multiple ‘tools’ brought to bear in crafting (Shanks 1996), are suited to different functions of explanation. Indeed, apart from differing conceptions of the domain-side (culture) of the equation, this call for ‘pluralism’ bears theoretical similarity to the self-consciously ‘problem-oriented’ approach of processual archaeology (cf. Wylie 2002:57).

Yet there are three concerns which tinge this unity-in-pluralism assessment. First, situating the pluralism argument within contemporary circumstances, it may be the user-friendly version of academic interface, in the sense that academic wrangling is sublimated into (un)conscious cooperative effort. But it may ultimately have more to do with expanding academic positions and opportunities in the discipline, particularly with the expansion of archaeology departments and programs in the States and the gulf between contract (Cultural Resource Management) and academic archaeology (eg. Segal 2005 for expansion of the four-field system). Such increasing laissez-faire attitude to pluralistic and insulated archaeological approaches based upon academic opportunity is theoretically countenanced by the acceptance of the post-Kuhnian un-bundling of particular disciplines into ‘the disunity of the sciences’. A pessimistic prognosis, based upon anecdotes familiar enough to academics, is that the distinct and insulated, noncompetitive programs of archaeological pedagogy and practice allow for co-habitation in a non-communicative house of dysfunction.

This leads to the second concern; one that is anecdotally apparent to archaeologists in large, inter-disciplinarian contexts of engagement. The argument that such incommensurable intellectual frameworks within archaeology allows for little productive debate. With varying configurations of the domain of archaeology and evaluative principles, there remains little criteria for evaluation of alternate research programs. That there is little except passive acceptance of established niches of archaeological interest. Under such a pluralistic and inclusive meta-framework, what role remains for academic debate and theoretical discussion. Without the strictures of evaluation on a cross-disciplinary level, there seems little to dispel dispersion of the discipline.

Finally, operating from varying theoretical premises and methodological principles, the niches of archaeology continue to ply their particular traditions because they work. That is, some measure of consensus within a particular research framework is reached whereby productive lines of inquiry are tacitly affirmed and continued. Without a touchstone of evaluative reasoning, the discipline becomes further entrenched in discrepant programs whose productive research reinforces a ‘lack of touch’ with other archaeological interests. The productive success of these research niches are part of the ‘getting on with it’ sentiment: if it works, why focus on a program’s epistemological anchoring or justification. To be sure, such a ‘golden marshalltown’ attitude has its merits by focusing less on abstract justification principles, and more on practical outcome. And while such an attitude of ‘common science/sense’ may exacerbate divisions and contibute to lack of common ground between practicing niches, an examination and extrapolation of such justification by practical utility on an explicit scale may provide more cohesion in archaeology than the various and problematic epistemic settlements.

Forward to Trigger’s ‘moderate relativism’ as unification: pragmatic justification

Containments

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