Category:	Science and Technology
Domain:	Geography of Science
Keywords:	Knowledge, communication & learning - basic research, scientific infrastructure
Outlook:	Over the next 50 years, the long US dominance of a wide range of fields in science and technology is likely to end as the global scientific playing field becomes flatter and more diverse.
Summary Analysis:	For the last 50 years, global science has been dominated by a handful of countries: the US, the UK, Germany, France, Japan, and a few others. Of these, the US has been the top player: it has had the largest, best-funded, and most vibrant scientific community; it has encouraged and rewarded technological innovation; and it has attracted scientists and engineers from around the world. Over the next 50 years, this scientific US hegemony is expected to end. The coming world of global science is likely to be more diffuse, with high mobility among scientists, the emergence of multiple centers of excellence, and a more even (but far from uniform) distribution of scientific and technical talent. It might also be characterised by the movement of a number of small states into world leadership positions in specialised fields, or into dominant positions at the margins between disciplines or between the laboratory and the marketplace. The EU and developed Asian countries (Korea, Japan, India, and possibly China) have the potential to become more attractive and interesting places to conduct basic research. • Great powers: States like Britain and Germany are likely to continue to be leaders in a variety of sciences, but the range of challengers will grow - particularly in interdisciplinary areas and emerging fields of research that do not require massive capital investments. The degree to which these countries maintain their pre-eminence is likely to depend partly on internal factors, such as domestic investment in basic research and ability to attract (but not necessarily permanently retain) talent from around the world. Just as financial institutions today succeed not by hoarding capital but by circulating it, tomorrow's scientific state could succeed by circulating and enhancing human capital. States with significant antiscience movements (like the Intelligent Design movement in the United States) could face decline. • Small developed nations: Developed nations that have had more modest scientific capabilities could have an opportunity to create world-class expertise in targeted areas. None are likely to challenge the great powers across a variety of fields but instead could focus on building excellence in interdisciplinary fields, in applied sciences, or in areas that draw on a mix of scientific expertise and local culture. Singapore's efforts to become a world power in biotechnology (based largely on the importation of world-class talent from Europe and the US), South Korea's work in stem cell research, and Denmark's emergence as a power in high-tech product design (which builds on a long, world-class reputation in architecture and furniture) are examples of local excellence with global appeal. • Emerging states: Developing countries that are able to participate in international collaboration in ways that allow them to build their domestic communities (as Brazil, for example, is likely to do) have the potential to follow a path similar to the small nations. The great unknown among the emerging states is China. Despite its massive output of scientists and engineers and its recent success at luring home PhDs trained in the West, China is not likely to emerge as a scientific world power in the absence of political liberalisation. Historically, authoritarian states develop world-class expertise in more theoretical rather than practical subjects and do poorly at translating scientific strength into technical and economic innovation.

	Implications:	Redistribution of the global scientific talent pool Potential for more rapid growth in scientific expertise among emerging countries and small developed nations, and slower growth among developed nations that have traditionally been strong in science
	Early Indicators:	Growing importance of small states like South Korea, Singapore, and Finland in science and technology
	What to Watch:	Spending on basic scientific research in emerging nations approaches US and EU levels of spending. Small developed and emerging nations increase their scientific productivity and succeed in translating investments in basic research into technical innovations, as shown by scienometric indicators. Graduate students in science flow into small developed and emerging nations, influencing the countries' long-term connectedness in global scientific communities and exchanges, and their ability to attract new generations of students and scientists.
	Parallels/Precedents:	Fundamental structural changes in the global geography of science in the late 19th and early 20th century, and during the early Cold War
	Enablers/drivers:	Greater mobility among scientists and engineers as bureaucratic rules hindering worker mobility are lowering, and rules governing access to national educational systems are relaxing Increased international collaboration among EU countries and scientists in developing countries, particularly in large-scale projects that require the combined resources of a number of countries (such as space exploration or high-energy physics) and interdisciplinary projects that require assembling expertise from a variety of places Replacement of 'brain drain' by 'brain circulation', whereby talented people spend extended periods of time working outside the countries of their birth but do not stay away forever
	Leaders:	Regions: Biopolis, Singapore [link] Seoul National University, South Korea [link] Kyoto, Japan Andhra Pradesh, India [link] Zhongguancun Science Park, China [link] Cambridge Science Park, UK [link] Neuroscience research institute in Natal, Brazil Hsinchu Science Park, Taiwan New Zealand science [link] Australia's biotechnology industry [link] ITER (international fusion project) [link]
	Figures:
	Sources:	Gili S. Drori, John W. Meyer, Francisco O. Ramirez, and Evan Schofer, Science in the Modern World Polity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005). Bernardo Esteves, "Reverse brain drain: the lure of Latin America," SciDevNet (August 14 2003). [link] Michael Fullilove and Chloë Flutter, Diaspora: The World Wide Web of Australians. Lowy Institute Paper 04 (2004). [link] David Hanson, "Gloomy Science Future Forseen," Chemical and Engineering News (April 28, 2004). [link] Hilary Marshall, "Are British Scientists Language Dunces?" Science (June 8, 2001). [link] Sami Mahroum, "Europe and the Challenge of the Brain Drain," IPTS Reports 29. [link] Sami Mahroun, "Scientific Mobility: An Agent of Scientific Expansion and Institutional Empowerment," Braingain-- The instruments conference proceedings (September 30, 2004). [link] Thomas Schott, "Ties between Center and Periphery in the Scientific World-System: Accumulation of Rewards, Dominance and Self-Reliance in the Center," Journal of World-Systems Research 4:2 (1998), 112-144. [link] Adam Segal, "Is America Losing Its Edge?," Foreign Affairs (November 17 2004). [link] Campaign for Science and Engineering in the UK [link] Hah-Zoong Song, "Networking lessons from Taiwan and South Korea," SciDevNet (May 2003). [link] Mark Tomlinson and Ian Miles, The Career Trajectories of Knowledge Workers [link] Li Zhenzhen, Institute of Policy and Management, Chinese Academy of Sciences, et al. "Health biotechnology in China—reawakening of a giant." Nature Biotechnology 22, DC13 - DC18 (2004) [link] Nandini K Kumar, Indian Council of Medical Research, et al. "Indian biotechnology—rapidly evolving and industry led." Nature Biotechnology 22, DC31 - DC36 (2004) [link] "Competing Through Innovation and Learning." United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) 2002-3 [link]

	At A Glance:	When:	21-50 years
		Where:	Global
		How Fast:	Years
		Likelihood:	Medium-High
		Impact:	Medium-High
		Controversy:	Medium

Related Outlooks: